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Foreword 
Energy is the focus of many national and international studies. One of the major questions 
is to  select the energy options to match supply and demand. Because there are no immediate 
better alternatives a great amount of effort has to  be spent on comparing the pros and cons of 
different supply options. The formulation of a national energy policy can be a process for making 
that  comparison. Different countries have arrived a t  different solutions and it is interesting in 
hindsight to  understand how these solutions were obtained. 
This paper considers Sweden as a case for how the formulation of a national energy strategy can 
develop. It presents work done during the summer of 199:L by a member of the Young Scientists 
Summer Program (YSSP) a t  IIASA. It is of interest to  scientists and policy makers working 
with energy policies, risks and public decision making. 
Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank the following people for supplying information and for comment- 
ing on earlier drafts of this paper: Bji5rn Wahlstrom, Brian Cook, Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, 
Laura Kelly, Evert Vedung, Hans Rode and Robert Mitchell. 
This paper was funded by the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research (FRN) 
and was carried out when the author was a member of the Young Scientists Summer Program 
a t  the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of FRN or IIASA. 
Contents 
1 Introduction 1 
2 Energy Policy in Sweden 2 
2.1 The 1960's and 70's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
2.2 Between Three Mile Island and Chernobyl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
2.3 Chernobyl and after . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
2.4 Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
3 T h e  Energy Policy Situation Today 8 
3.1 Resolving the dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . . . . 8 
3.2 Critique of alternatives: the role of public opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; . 11 
3.3 The 1990-1991 Energy Commission: a government response . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
4 Public Participation 
5 Conclusions 
vii 
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Ragnar E. Lofstedt* 
1 Introduction 
Energy policy is a difficult topic for most nations. Predictions of future energy productioil 
and consumption are often highly inaccurate, flawed by the inability of analysts to  adequately 
calculate the importance of political upheavals, energy accidents, war, other surprises, and the 
role of the mass media (Lee et al. 1990). Furthermore, energy prediction scenarios are based 
on past experiences which ma.y be skewed or altered by the country's political process, or by 
the personal opinion of the scenario writers (Lindberg 1977a and b, Senior Expert Symposium 
1991). 
Sweden has often been used as an example to  illustrate effective public participation in national 
energy policy. For example, Lindberg (1977b) makes the points that  Sweden does not have the 
institutional and structural obstacles to  policy making prevalent in other nations, and that  the 
Swedish public are able to  influence the policy process by active participation in the political 
party system. Although these observations may still be valid today, they have not prevented 
Swedish energy policy to  suffer from a series of hastened, dogmatic, and contradictory policy 
decisions over the past twenty-five years.' 
Sweden is facing an energy dilemma. As a result of a national referendum in 1980 the government 
is committed to  phasing-out the country's twelve nuclear reactors, representing 50 percent of the 
total electricity production. This policy, in conjunction with several others, has had far reaching 
effects on the production and consumption of electricity in Sweden. Although recent efforts 
have been made to  adapt the energy policy in the changing political environment, it presents 
many problems. Partly due to  this the Social Democratic Party (the strongest political party 
in Sweden) is in disarray. 
In this paper, I seek to  do the following: a)  outline the major political energy decisions that  
have been made over the last two and a half decades, b) examine the reasons why they were 
made, and c) discuss the lessons learnt from (a) and (b), d)  offer public participation as the best 
alternative to  Swedish energy policy making. 
'hlember of the Young Scientists Summer Program 1991 at  IIASA. 
Home Institute: Clark University, Graduate School of Geography, 950 Main Street, Worcester, hlA 016101-477, 
USA. 
'Lindberg's discussion on the energy syndrome has been criticized elsewhere as possibly depicting premature 
uncertainty (Tugwell 1980). 
2 Energy Policy in Sweden 
Swedish energy policy over the past 25 years can be looked a t  in three phases: 
1. before the 1980 nuclear referendum, which came about because of tne Three Mile Island 
accident; 
2. the time between the referendum and the Chernobyl accident; and 
3. the period following the Chernobyl accident. 
2.1 The 1960's and 70's 
In late 1967, the government decided not to  harness the Vindel river for electricity production 
purposes. This decision was made in the face of intense local and national opposition to  the 
hydropower alternative, arising from the realization that  only four large, free-flowing rivers were 
left in Sweden, and a preference that  they should remain unspoiled. 
This controversy over hydropower led the State Power Board (the largest utility in Sweden) 
to  invest in alternative energy sources to meet future electricity demand. At first the most 
economical replacement was thought to be oil condense power,2 which in 1967 was about the 
same price as hydropower, but after the 1973 Arabian oil embargo (Sweden was dependent on 
oil for 70% of its energy needs a t  this time) these plans were permanently abandoned. The 
nuclear alternative, which had been steadily gaining popularity with the utility companies took 
the place of the oil alternative. 
Sweden's nuclear program was highly ambitious: i t  led to the construction of twelve nuclear 
reactors a t  four distinct sites3 along the south-Swedish sea coast. This nuclear capacity con- 
tributed to  a surplus of electricity, since production more than doubled from 66.5 T W h  in 1971 
to  142 T W h  by 1990 (SOU 1990). In 1987, there were twelve nuclear reactors, generating nearly 
half of Sweden's electricity, making Sweden one of the most nuclear power intensive countries 
in the world. As a result of the large increase in electricity supply, electricity prices fell from 
1978 to  1986 a t  a time when Sweden had the second highest inflation rate in Europe after Italy 
(Figure 1). This, combined with several other factors, such as the high price of heating oil,4 en- 
coura,ged homeowners to install electrical heating systems to tap  the cheap energy source (Tyler 
and Schipper 1990). 
Nuclear power: technical development 
The Swedish nuclear power program has a relatively long history. I t  began in 1945 with the 
formation of the Royal Commission on Nuclear Energy, which later became the Atom Committee. 
The commission was interested in the development of both military and civil nuclear technology.5 
In the late 1940's, the Atom Committee helped coordinate a joint venture with the Swedish 
government, AB Atomenergi, which built the first Swedish reactor (fueled by natural uranium) 
2 0 i l  is burnt and the heat resulting from the combustion process produces steam which drives a turbine 
generating electricity. 
3Four reactors were built at the Ringhals plant 50 kilometers north of Gothenburg, two at the Barsebick plant 
near Malm6 and Copenhagen, three at the Oskarhamn plant located close to the provincial town of Kalmar, and 
three 80 kilometers north of Stockholm at the Forsmark site. 
'Also it should be noted that electric heaters are relatively cheap compared to other conventional types and 
their installation costs are low. This makes them popular in the Swedish building trade (Mills 1991). 
'The military component was much debated by parliament, and military nuclear research continued secretly 
until 1972. 
- ,  Constant 1971 R i c e r  
Figure 1: The electricity costs for the electric intensive industry* between the years 1971-1987. 
Constant 1971 prices. 
Source: SOU 1990. 
*) Similar price curve can be found in the residential sector (Mills 1991). 
in 1954.~ This year saw a further boost to  the Swedish Nuclear program with the Atoms For 
Peace conference in 1954 (Wittrock and Lindstrom 1984), resulting in the purchase of a light 
water reactor from the United States (Jasper 1990). 
However, the tide turned back in favor of the natural uranium technology in the early 1960's 
following the decision by the Swedish State Power Board, in cooperation with AB Atomenergi, to  
build a third reactor, Agesta (near Stockholm), which was to  be the prototype for a much larger 
reactor a t  Marviken. The Agesta project was delayed for several years and costs of the plant 
doubled. In 1964, the State Power Board, encouraged by the success of Light Water reactors 
in the United States and Germany as well as discouraged by the technical and economical 
problems associated with the development of natural uranium reactors, withdrew from the 
hilarviken project, effectively ending the potential commercialization of natural uranium reactors 
in Sweden (Jasper 1990). From 1964 onwards, the State Power Board and private utilities focused 
exclusively on the use of light water technology, and by 1985 twelve nuclear reactors were on 
line. 
Nuclear Policy 
The build up of nuclear power went smoothly until 1973. The Swedish government and the 
opposition members of parliament vigorously supported nuclear power, seeing it is as the energy 
source that would relieve the pressure t o  dam more rivers for electricity (Vedung 1980a). 
In the Autumn of 1972, the Center Party's energy expert, Birgitta Hambreus, in an attempt 
to  win votes from the urban middle class, and from people sympathetic with the environmen- 
'The first and third Swedish reactors were fueled by natural uranium and used heavy water as a moderator. 
The atomic engineers at the time envisaged the nuclear program would use natural uranium, which the country 
has vast quantities of, albeit of low quality. However, light water reactors require enriched uranium which has to 
be imported. 
tal movement, raised the moral issue of the dangers and persistence of nuclear waste (Vedung 
1991b).~ This initial questioning of nuclear power promoted widespread discussion and resulted 
in the Social Democrats passing a nuclear moratorium for two years starting in 1973. Addi- 
tionally, prior to the 1976 elections, the Social Democratic government passed the 1975 Energy 
Act as an attempt to  diffuse the nuclear power issue. I t  called for a small increase in the use 
of nuclear power (from 11 t o  13 reactors), and for increased emphasis on energy conservation 
(Jasper 1990, Lonnroth 1977). However, i t  failed to  settle the future use of nuclear' power, and 
the issue was again debated in the 1976 elections. 
The anti-nuclear feeling among the voting public was partially responsible for the Social Demo- 
crats loosing control of the Riksdag for the first time in over 44 years t o  a center-right coalition 
headed by the anti-nuclear Center Party (Jasper 1990, Jones et al. 1980, Kaijser et  al. 1991, 
Sahr 1985, Vedung 1988).' With the Center Party in power, the anti-nuclear activists both 
within and outside of the government had hoped that  Sweden would exit the nuclear era. Yet 
during the center-right coalition, nuclear reactors were continuously put on line. Falldin, the 
leader of the Center Party, was seen as a traitor t o  the cause, and this ultimately led t o  the 
Center Party loosing control of the government two years later (Abrams 1979, Vedung 1980b, 
1988) .~  
The nuclear policy controversy came t o  a head following the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. 
Olof Palme, the leader of the  Social Democratic Party, had for a long time been a strong 
supporter of nuclear power and against a nuclear referendum. On April 4, 1979, however, after 
a week of intense media coverage of the nuclear accident, Palme, afraid of loosing more anti- 
nuclear supporters to  the Center Party in the upcoming September 1979 elections, announced 
that  he was in favor of a nuclear referendum. Within hours the other parties agreed t o  Palme's 
suggestion. 
The process of determining acceptable alternatives for consideration in the referendum was 
not easy. At the beginning of the referendum campaign there were only two alternatives: a)  
the six reactors in use would be phased-out over a twelve year period and the six under con- 
struction should never be completed; and b) a total of twelve nuclear reactors would be built 
and these would eventually be phased-out a t  a pace suited to  the Swedish economy. The first 
alternative was supported by the Center Party, the Communists, and the small Christian Demo- 
cratic Party, while the second alternative was supported by the Conservatives, Liberals, and 
the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats, however, did not want to  be seen to  support the 
same alternative as the Conservatives. The Social Democrats considered themselves a worker's 
party, whereas the Conservatives were supported by the businessmen/women and industrialists. 
Furthermore, the Swedish Social Democratic Party had been warned by their Norwegian coun- 
terparts that  they could loose a large number of voters if they supported the same alternative 
a.s the Conservatives (Sahr 1985).1° Thus, the Social Democrats began including extra clauses 
'AS a result of the Center Party's environmental, and later anti-nuclear stance, i t  was able to  at t ract  voters 
who were distrustful of the intellectuals and technicians dominating Swedish politics. These same individuals saw 
opposing nuclear power as a way of signaling a protest to  the centralized political system in Stockholm (Jasper 
1990, Kelman 1976). In the 1973 and 1976 elections the Center Party was able to  increase i ts  electoral support by 
gaining votes among the urban, middle class whilst maintaining its electoral base in rural communities (Sirlvik 
1977). 
'A case can be made, however, that many of those who voted for the anti-nuclear Center Party associated 
nuclear power with the distrusted intellectuals and technicians based in Stockholm (Jasper 1990). If this is correct, 
then the anti-nuclear vote was not a vote against nuclear power per se, but rather a vote against the political 
establishment in Stockholm. 
'Although the Center Party lost control of the government in 1978, the Conservative coalition won again in 
the 1979 elections (a  campaign in which the nuclear power controversy played only a limited role), enabling the 
Center Party to  form a new government with Fa ld in  as Prime Minister. 
'O1n Norway, during the European Common Market membership referendum in 1972, the Social Democrats 
supported the same alternative as the Conservatives. Following the referendum, many Social Democrats continued 
to vote for the Conservatives in the general elections (Jasper 1990). 
and sub-clauses in the alternative, which the Conservatives could not support. This resulted in 
the breakup of the alliance with the Social Democrats and it precipitated t o  three alternatives 
for the referendum. 
The referendum was conducted one year after the accident in March of 1980, enabling nuclear 
power to  be a non issue a t  the 1979 elections (Sahr 1985).11 Based on the results, with the 
majority of the public favoring t o  shut down the twelve reactors a t  a pace suited t o  the Swedish 
economy, parliament passed an energy act in June 1980 that  included a range of measures 
to  facilitate reduced dependence on nuclear power. The main stipulations of the act were as 
follows (after Jones et al. 1980): a )  a decrease in the dependence on oil; b) the introduction of 
more renewable energy sources into the nation's fuel mix; c) increased safety in nuclear power 
plants; d )  promotion of energy conservation; e) plans to  reduce dependence on electricity;12 and 
f )  a phase-out of the twelve reactors by 2010, which a t  the time roughly corresponded t o  the 
projected lifetime of the newest reactors. Moreover, all existing nuclear reactors were discounted 
over the same twenty-five year period, meaning that  the phase-out of nuclear power by 2010 
would not theoretically result in gross capital losses. 
2.2 Between Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
After the referendum most anti-nuclear groups, as well as the general public, were exhausted. 
The issues had been debated a t  such great lengths in the year between the Three Mile Island 
accident and the referendum, that  people were tired of the topic, and in a matter of months it 
was little discussed (Sahr 1985).13 Only a year after the referendum, opinion polls showed that  
nuclear power was again gaining support as the Three Mile Island accident was forgotten (Biel 
et al. 1989).14 
By 1982, nuclear power was no longer prominent on the political agenda. Energy policy makers 
had shifted their attention t o  the issue of reducing oil use, as a result of the second oil crisis that  
occurred in 1979. The Swedish government had detailed plans for decreasing the dependence 
of oil (per capita oil consumption was the highest in the  world (Lonnroth et  al. 1979)) from 
70% of the nation's fuel mix to  40%, or by 9 million metric tons through the use of alternative 
energy sources and conservation (Sahr 1985). In fact, Palme, in his speech following the  Social 
Democrats win in the 1982 elections, emphasized the issue of oil substitution over the phase-out 
of nuclear power (Sahr 1985). 
Oil use decreased faster than most policy analysts had expected. This trend had several under- 
lying factors: firstly, oil prices remained high in the early 1980's following the 1979 Iranian oil 
crisis. Secondly, the utilities were promoting heating to  secure a market for the  electricity from 
Sweden's last two nuclear reactors, Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3. The utilities were further 
helped by the government's reduction of the tax  on electricity in January of 1984 (Kaijser 1988). 
"The referendum offered three alternatives: (1) a total of twelve reactors would be used in the Swedish nuclear 
program. These reactors would be shut down a t  a pace suited to  the economy; i.e., they would not be phased- 
out  if economic growth was threatened; (2) was similar t o  ( I ) ,  but additional clauses were added emphasizing 
energy conservation and renewables, and stating tha t  all nuclear power stations should be owned by the s tate  
and municipalities; (3) implied tha t  the six reactors in use should be phased-out over ten years, a t  most, and the 
six under construction should never be completed. The  results of the referendum were as follows: 18.9% for ( I ) ,  
39.1% for (2) ,  and 38.7% for (3). 
''This measure was added t o  the 1980 law, as an attempt to  discourage the use of electrical space heating in 
homes. I t  was largely unsuccessful, as residential use of electricity continued t o  increase by 5% a year in the 
1980's (SOU 1990). 
1 3 ~ h e  decline in interest in the nuclear power debate after the referendum may also have been due to widespread 
industrial action by many unions, causing severe disruption in Sweden for five weeks in early 1980, and dominating 
public debate (Sahr 1985). 
"Political leaders, however, continued in-depth discussions about the implications of the nuclear referendum 
(i.e., those surrounding the eventual phase-out of nuclear power) until 1986. 
Already by 1985, the government's anti-oil policy seemed to  have worked. The amount of oil in 
municipal centralized heating systems, for example, had decreased from 90% in 1980, t o  under 
40% by 1985. Most of the heating oil was replaced by bio fuels (forest products), coal, and large 
amounts of cheap electricity generated by nuclear power (Swedish Energy Administration 1986). 
In the mid- 19807s, industrialists argued that nuclear power should be used beyond 2010 whenever 
possible, to  maintain the cheap electricity needed to  maintain the profitability of many Swedish 
manufacturing companies. Further support for the maintenance of nuclear power was seen in 
studies by the nuclear industry, showing that  reactors would soon become profitable, despite over 
budget construction costs of the last two reactors. The Chernobyl accident of 1986, however, 
caused a dramatic upset in this increasingly pro-nuclear scenario. 
2.3 Chernobyl and after 
Following the Chernobyl accident, which spread radiation over wide areas of northern Sweden, 
contaminating reindeer, mushrooms, and fish (Broadbent 1986), there was general confusion 
and renewed fear over the role of nuclear power. This rising antagonism was illustrated in a 
1986 survey (SIFO) where sixty percent of the Swedish public voiced their opposition to  nuclear 
power (Biel et al. 1989). The Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, was among those who voiced 
anti-nuclear sentiments (Flavin 1987). The Chernobyl accident also led the public to listen once 
more to  the anti-nuclear lobby.15 
By the spring of 1988 Birgitta Dahl (Social Democrat), the Environment and Energy Minister 
and an anti-nuclear activist, stated, with little initial parliamentary debate, that  two nuclear 
reactors (one a t  Ringhals and one a t  Barseback) would be phased-out by 1996 as a first step in 
the removal of all twelve reactors by 2010 (Social Democrats 1989). Dahl's views were echoed by 
the Prime Minister and by much of parliament itself-where the Center Party, Communists, and 
Greens (who crossed the 4% support threshold to  enter parliament in 1988) shared her opinion. 
However, there was little support from within the Social Democratic Party, or from the general 
public, for her accelerated phase-out schedule. In August of 1989, two powerful trade union 
officials, Stig Malm and Rune Molin (the Director and Vice-Director of the Swedish Trade Union 
organization), stated that  an early phase-out of nuclear power would cause electricity prices to 
a t  least double causing severe economic and employment problems. Due to  increasing political 
and public opposition to  an accelerated phase-out of nuclear power, Rune Molin, one of those 
officials, replaced Birgitta Dahl as Energy Minister in January 1990, effectively terminating the 
discussion of the accelerated phase-out. 
Concurrent t o  these developments in 1987, the government passed the Natural Resource Law, 
which stipulated that  the four remaining free flowing rivers would be protected from hydro 
electric development for all time. This law was also passed a t  a time when certain elements 
within the labor unions were in favor of damming up one, if not two, rivers for hydro-electric 
production. 
Real electricity prices in Sweden had actually fallen from 1978 t o  1986, before stabilizing in 
1988. The cheap electricity was a result of a number of intertwined variables: 
1. Large amounts of hydropower were being generated from already discounted hydro-electric 
infrastructures enabling the hydro-electricity t o  be virtually free, as the production cost of 
electricity did not reflect any capital costs, but only the operation and maintenance costs 
(Vedung 1988). As a result, although nuclear power had high capital costs as well as larger 
15~ddit ionally,  two years after the Chernobyl accident, the Swedish public expressed anxiety about eating 
reindeer meat, seeing it as radioactive (L6fstedt and White 1990). 
maintenance costs than hydropower, the price of electricity had t o  be uniform across the 
nation, causing the hydropower sector to, in effect, "subsidize" the nuclear power sector. 
2. There was also a large surplus of electricity on the market due t o  miscalculations of the 
utility industries who foresaw greater growth in the electrical sector than had actually 
occurred. 
3. Sweden had limited export possibilities, since most of its neighboring countries had enough 
electricity to  meet their own needs (Norway even has a surplus of electricity). Also, since 
there were no large cables connecting the Swedish mainland to  continental Europe a t  the 
time, the Swedish utilities were barred from the lucrative German market. 
The cheap electricity caused two distinct problems: First, as electricity remained cheap, com- 
panies and utilities saw little incentive to  promote energy conservation or to  invest in renewable 
energy technologies. Energy was still conserved, due to the stringent building codes (Tyler and 
Schipper 1990), but research and development of new renewable energy technologies diminished 
significantly (Grubb 1989, Melander 1990). Second, the electricity intensive industries (pulp, 
paper, aluminum, and steel), also the largest Swedish net exporters, experienced a boom period 
in the 1980's and became heavily dependent on the cheap electricity. As the renewed discussion 
of nuclear phase-out escalated, some large companies (eg. Stora, MODO, SCA) threatened to  
move their production sights abroad where electricity prices were lower.16 l7 
To add to  the policy squeeze on electricity production, Sweden was striving t o  meet the Toronto 
Agreement calling for a twenty percent reduction of carbon dioxide by the year 2005. To facilitate 
this the government passed a bill in late 1988 stipulating that  carbon dioxide emissions be 
maintained at  1988 levels (the bill was later modified so that  the carbon dioxide emissions will 
be stabilized by the year 2000 instead of being maintained a t  1988 levels). This bill, supported 
by the Conservative, Green, and Communist parties,'' was passed t o  block the attempts of 
Dahl and other anti-nuclear advocates to  phase-out nuclear power and replace it with fossil fuels 
(Vedung 1991b). In Sweden's case this would be mainly natural gas imported from Norway or 
the Soviet Union, and coal imported from Poland, USSR, and the United States. 
The confluence of outside events, domestic politics, existing policies, and subsequent policy 
decisions, have brought Sweden face to  face with the following energy dilemma: 
a.) Nuclear power may be phased out in Sweden by 2010, if not sooner; while 
b) no more free flowing rivers will be harnessed for hydropower purposes; and 
c) fossil fuels cannot be used t o  replace the electricity lost as this will substantially increase 
carbon dioxide emissions, which the government has pledged to  stabilize by the year 2000; 
and 
d )  other renewable energy sources do not seem t o  be economically viable or acceptable by 
the larger utilities; and 
e) energy conservation is an alternative that has already been widely implemented; while 
1 6 ~ n  example of this is Stora's acquisition of Feldmiihle Nobel, a large German paper company in the spring 
of 1990. 
I7ln several cases the uncertain policy situation has prevented the utilities offering energy intensive companies 
more than two-year contracts for electricity-greatly inhibiting the ability for energy intensive industry to invest. 
Meanwhile, Norway and France have offered Swedish pulp firms 20-25 year electricity contracts with prices that 
are similar, or lower than those in Sweden (Olofsson 1990). 
" ~ l t h o u ~ h  the Socialists controlled the government, they did not have an absolute majority: in recent elec- 
tions the Socialists have gained power with the help of the Communist Party. On this occasion, however, the 
Communists voted against the Socialist Party. 
Table 1: Electricity consumption: breakdown by sector (1989). 
TWH % 
Industry 51.0 
Public Sector 24.0 
Heating 27.0 
Household 15.0 
District Heating and Refineries 7.5 
Transportation 2.6 
Losses 11.0 
Total 138.1 100 
Source: Vattenfall 1990. 
f )  the importation of electricity is not in the long term a lucrative alternative as  it is likely 
that  all excess electricity in Scandinavia will go t o  the highest bidder. 
2.4 Implications 
Sweden currently consumes around 138.1 Tera Watt Hours (TWh) [one billion kilo watt hours] 
of electricity per year (Table 1). With a total production of around 142.5 T W h  (Table 2), this 
gives a surplus of 4.4 TWh, which is sold to  neighboring Scandinavian countries. The phase-out 
of nuclear power will, overall, decrease electricity output by 73.5 T W h  (Table 2), while the 
market demand is projected t o  increase a t  around 6% per annum over the same period.lg 
3 The Energy Policy Situation Today 
3.1 Resolving the dilemma 
As Swedish policy makers seek t o  reconcile the energy policy decisions of the past, sharp di- 
visions between various political groups, among policy makers themselves, and between policy 
makers and the general public have appeared. The ongoing debate has produced five alternative 
scenarios. 
1. Postponing the phase-out of nuclear power: The 1990 Socialist Party congress decided, 
following intense pressure from the trade unions, that  the 1996 phase-out of two reactors 
would be postponed. In January of 1991 this was ratified by parliament. 
2. Annuling the carbon dioxide agreement: A movement within the Socialist government, the 
Center Party and certain environmental groups supporting this option has emerged. The 
emission levels stipulated in the 1988 carbon dioxide agreement would be exceeded in order 
IgDue to an extremely mild winter, and because of an economic recession, electricity consumption increased by 
only 1% in 1990. 
Table 2: Electricity production: breakdown by sector (1991) 
TWH % 
Nuclear 73.5 51.5 
Hydro 62.3 43.7 
Oil Condensing 
Gas Turbines 
Combined Heat and Power 
Industrial Backpressure 6.7 4.8 
Coal 
Total 142.5 100.0 
Source: Energimagasinet  1992. 
t o  phase-out nuclear power and replace it with fossil fuels.20 The global environmental 
wisdom of such moves has been highlighted by recent studies that  indicate it would be 
more economical for Sweden t o  finance carbon dioxide and other emissions abatement in 
foreign nations than a t  home (Swedish Energy Administration 1989).~' 
Despite the policy uncertainty surrounding this alternative, Swedish utilities have pressed 
ahead with the development of gas-fired and coal-fired generating capacity. In terms of 
coal-fired co-generation plants, the one that  has received the most attention in the recent 
year is Stockholm Energi's plant located a t  Vartan. Although it is considered t o  be one of 
the most sophisticated plants built t o  date using state of the art  fluidized bed combustion 
and advanced scrubber technology, it still produces large amounts of carbon dioxide. 
In recent years, most discussions of fossil fuels have centered on natural gas. Based on 
economic analysis, the State Power Board, along with other utilities, has built a natural 
gas pipeline from Denmark t o  Malmo and then from Malmo to  Gothenburg. This extends 
the potential use of gas imported from Denmark. The utilities argue that ,  although natural 
gas would increase carbon dioxide emissions, it will be the  cheapest form of electricity to  
replace nuclear power.** 0 thers argue, however, that  a large influx of natural gas onto the 
Swedish energy market is a further attempt by the large utility companies t o  consolidate 
their power in the energy sector (Kaijser et  al. 1 9 9 1 ) . ~ ~  
3. Annuling the hydropower agreement of 1987: Many trade union officials, utility managers, 
and certain industrialists favor harnessing the four remaining rivers for hydropower as the 
only realistic alternative if nuclear power is phased-out. There are several advantages of 
''The Greens are split concerning this issue. At the party congress in June 1990, some members wanted to 
back down on the agreement to limit carbon dioxide emissions in order to  phase-out nuclear power, while others 
believed that i t  could be phased-out without annuling the carbon dioxide bill. 
211n this study the Swedish Energy Administration concluded that ,  in terms of pure economics, one would gain 
more by installing pollution control devices on Polish power plants (which currently do not have any such devices) 
than by investing on similar measures for Swedish plants (which already have state-of-the-art scrubbers installed), 
"1t is also a much cleaner fossil fuel, and if nuclear power is not phased-out as planned, the policy makers 
argue that  i t  should still be introduced as a replacement for coal and oil. 
2 3 ~ t  should be remembered that  although natural gas was successfully installed in homes around Malm6, mainly 
because gas lines remained from the town gas era (in fact Malm6, Helsingborg, and Lund still had town gas 
companies operating a t  the time natural gas was introduced) i t  is doubtful if i t  could make inroads in areas where 
there are no existing local pipelines (Kaijser 1988). 
constructing large scale, hydro-electric schemes. Firstly, to  do so would provide 35 TWh 
of energy, roughly the equivalent of six nuclear reactors and provide many jobs in the 
economically depressed regions of the north. Secondly, hydropower has already established 
itself as a profit maker with the utility companies, and there is a great deal of experience in 
the building and maintenance of dams. Thirdly, most of the hydro-electric schemes could 
be quite easily connected t o  the national grid, reducing the cost of installing new power 
lines. Fourthly, hydro-electric schemes are considered to  be a centralized power source, 
meaning that  they are controlled by the utility companies themselves, rather than by 
individuals: this preserves the source of financial power of the utility companies (Kaijser et 
al. 1991). Fifthly, studies show that a hydropower build up would be economically feasible, 
with the electricity produced accruing costs similar to  those of on-line nuclear plants, and 
lower than those of fossil fuels or renewable energy sources (SOU 1990). Lastly, proponents 
suggest that the power companies constructing hydro-electric dams have learned from 
previous mistakes, so future hydro-electric schemes will be much more environmentally 
benign. 
Opponents argue that  the four rivers were not built-out initially because of high costs, 
and by doing so now would incur greater costs and serious environmental damage. All the 
political parties (except a few socialists) oppose this alternative. 
4. Expansion of energy conservation and renewable energy sources: Certain academics, as well 
as the Green Party, believe that  nuclear power can be phased-out with the development 
of new renewable energy sources (such as biomass and wind) and by energy conservation 
measures (Bodlund et  al. 1989, Johansson 1990, Lonnroth et al. 1 9 8 0 ) . ~ ~  This effort has 
been funded mainly by the Swedish State Power Board through a 373 million Swedish 
crowns (SEK) energy conservation program (Vattenfall 1988) and a billion SEK biomass 
program. Preliminary results show that energy conservation could reduce the electricity 
consumed by 10-30% (depending upon how optimistic one is) (Vattenfall 1990). Renew- 
ables could replace the remainder with projected price increases ranging from zero to  over 
2 0 0 ~ 5 . 2 ~  26 
The incorporation of renewable energy sources, especially biomass, into the Swedish energy 
mix will not be easy. Those in the pulp and paper industry have attacked the State Power 
Board's biomass plan. They claim the scheme removes valuable raw materials from the 
pulp and paper industry, where the net capital return is much higher than use for electricity 
generation (Malmeblad 1989). However, the recent declines in pulp and paper prices 
(resulting from over production) (Sundberg 1991) undermine this argument. Secondly, 
incorporating renewable energy sources into the Swedish energy market, means that  there 
will be a massive influx of decentralized energy sources, ultimately resulting in the transfer 
of financial power from the utility companies t o  the individual power producers. Thus, it 
will be difficult for renewables to  make inroads on the Swedish energy scene, as the utility 
companies are against their introduction (Kaijser et al. 1991). 
5. Importing electricity from other nations: The final alternative favored by certain nuclear 
activists, as well as some utilities, is to import energy from neighboring countries t o  replace 
that  lost when nuclear power is phased-out. In theory this could be done. A cable (capacity 
24 The renewable energy debate is by no means new: in the 1970's renewables were discussed in terms of 
decentralized (renewables) vs. centralized (non-renewable) energy technologies. Academians favored the former 
option due to its flexibility and less state control (Johansson and Steen 1978, Lhnnroth 1977 and 1980). 
25Studies do, however, indicate that past projections for renewable energy have note been realized. It was 
planned in 1978, for example, that by 1990 2000 Giga watt hours (GWh) should be produced from wind power 
and 3000 GWh from solar. However, today only 4.6 and 25 are produced respectively (Melander 1990). 
 his wide range of price change depends upon the person/organization creating the scenario. People i n  the 
nuclear and energy intensive industries have calculated 200%+ price increases, while various environmental groups 
and the Green Party show scenarios with no price increase. 
500 MW) now links Forsmark and Nadendal, although built to  export electricity to Finland 
it could be used by Sweden to import power. At present this is unlikely as Finland currently 
has an electricity shortage. The recent application (in principle) by Perusvoima Oy to build 
a fifth nuclear reactor could, however, change this situation (Wahlstrom 1991b). More 
electricity could also be imported from Norway: currently about 2-4 TWh is imported each 
year. The Swedish State Power Board has recently signed an agreement with Norwegian 
Statkraft to  buy an additional 2.4 TWh starting in 1995 (Fosskekallan 1990). 
Sweden is a member of the Nordel agreement allowing the country to  trade electricity with its 
Scandinavian neighbors a t  stable, low prices. The future purchase of electricity under this agree- 
ment may be hindered as Sweden and other Nordic countries become more closely integrated 
with the European Community. For example, in early November, Sydkraft, the second largest 
utility in Sweden, signed an agreement with Preussen Elektra, a large German utility, to install 
a cable with a capacity of 500MW between the two countries. This will enable Germany, with 
its high domestic energy prices, to  buy cheap Norwegian and Swedish hydro-electricity. This 
cable, and possibly others, will invariably lead to  higher electricity prices in Sweden as excess 
energy production is sold to  the highest bidder, rather than selling it cheaply t o  domestic energy 
intensive industries (Froste 1991, Kolare 1990). 
3.2 Critique of alternatives: the role of public opinion 
In economic terms it would seem wise to  delay the decision of when to  phase-out the twelve 
nuclear reactors, as the potential of alternative electricity sources to  meet the shortfall is so 
uncertain (Swedish National Energy Administration 1990). Furthermore, the general public 
~velcomes such a decision. As of July 1990, surveys indicated that 47% of the population favored 
nuclear power compared to  35% against, and in November 1990 and in June 1991, 57% of the 
Swedish public favored nuclear power to  2010, if not beyond (Dagens Nyheter 1991, TEMO 
1990). 
Annuling the carbon dioxide bill in order to  phase-out nuclear power would have serious environ- 
mental consequences. With increased fossil fuel use, carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions 
will increase, exacerbating the problems of the greenhouse effect and acid rain. Additionally, 
one can make a strong case that by June 1992 all European nations, with the exception of the 
United Kingdom, will agree t o  comply with the Toronto accords (calling for a twenty percent 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions). In this case Sweden would face European-wide oppo- 
sition to  building new fossil fuel generating capacity. In recent studies by the author, results 
indicate that the general public is against the tearing up of the carbon dioxide agreement. They, 
by a margin of almost 3-1, would like the carbon dioxide emission cap to  be kept, as they are 
concerned about the changes in nature and preservation of bio diversity both in Sweden and 
abroad (Lofstedt 1990a and 1992).~? 
Harnessing the four remaining rivers appears t o  be a viable economic alternative on paper. 
However, it too would cause environmental damage which can be seen as unnecessary, if more 
environmentally sound electricity production technologies can be found. Furthermore, it must 
be remembered that Sweden is the only country in Europe which still has remaining a set of 
large unregulated free flowing rivers and therefore they could be considered a vital part of the 
European heritage. Finally, the issue of political ethics is again raised in this case, as the rivers 
are protected by a law with wide political and public support (Lofstedt 1991a). 
27These results are supported by a November 1990 survey conducted by SIFO, indicating that over 60% of 
respondents were opposed to tearing up the carbon-dioxide agreement to allow the phase-out of nuclear power 
(Svensko Dogblodet, 1990.) 
Perhaps the most valid alternative is to  expand energy conservation and renewable energy 
sources. In the short-term it  is still considered utopian by the Swedish utilities and indus- 
try, as well as by several energy experts (Moghissi 1991, Weinberg 1981). A certain percentage 
of energy could be conserved, and a certain amount generated from renewables, but it is unlikely 
that all the electricity lost in a nuclear phase-out could be replaced by this alternative in the 
short term. A longer-term view of this option, however, suggests its real potential. In order for 
this to occur, energy policy makers must understand that the environment, the economy, and 
energy use form a unified system. This means that energy costs of various production sources 
will reflect their true cost, enabling renewables to  be more competitive in the market (Linberg 
1977 a and b). The general public, by a large majority, favors this alternative, and would be 
willing t o  conserve more energy wherever possible (Lofstedt 1990, 1991b). 
Importing energy seems viable a t  first glance, but the attendant increasing trade deficits would 
not be conducive to  such an alternative. The global dimension of environmentalism is also raised 
by this option. It can be said to  be of greater environmental importance, from a global point 
of view, for Sweden to keep its nuclear power plants than to  import electricity that  has been 
produced by coal from Germany. Importation of electricity from other countries also raises the 
problem of security, as supplies are unlikely to  be as reliable as domestic ones. The public are 
in general against this alternative as they want Sweden to  be independent in its use of energy 
3.3 The 1990-1991 Energy Commission: a government response 
Despite the many political and policy conflicts, the government has been moving to  resolve the 
energy dilemma. Based on the findings of the Commission, composed of energy experts from the 
Social Democrat, Center and Liberal Parties, Parliament approved an amended energy policy 
in early 1991 (Riksdagen 1990-91). 
Firstly, it was decided that the nuclear phase-out will not begin by 1995-96, and nuclear power 
may remain after 2010. I t  will only be phased-out if the Swedish economy or work force will not 
suffer any ill consequences. This stipulation has been considered to  be a face-saving clause for 
the political parties of the Commission. The Center Party, the most anti-nuclear of the three, 
can make the case that a nuclear phase-out will still begin in 1995, as they state there will be 
no negative effects on the economy by so doing. The Liberals, on the other hand, can equally 
claim that no nuclear reactor will be phased-out until long after 2010, as they believe that an 
early phase-out will damage the Swedish economy. 
Secondly, the decision was taken to  remove the carbon dioxide ceilings set a t  1988 levels, as the 
Commission believed that 1988 levels had already been surpassed in 1990. Despite statistics 
to  the contrary, from the Swedish Environment Protection Board, it was decided to  be neither 
economically nor technically feasible to  maintain the ceiling. Instead a greenhouse gas emission 
ca.p is proposed, in which all the greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxide, and 
various CFC's) are combined. Such a cap will be far easier for Sweden to adhere to  due to  its plan 
to  phase-out all remaining CFC's in accordance with the Montreal protocol. Furthermore, as 
CFC's have a longer life time than any other greenhouse gas, a complete phase-out will actually 
allow Sweden to  increase carbon dioxide emissions by twenty percent without going beyond the 
1990 greenhouse gas emission cap (Eriksson 1991). 
Thirdly, three and a half billion SEK will be put into research and development of renewable 
energy sources and energy conservation techniques. Additionally, nine hundred million SEI< will 
be invested in two prototype ethanol factories in an attempt to reduce Sweden's reliance on 
"In a recent study, for example, respondents indicated that they would be willing to conserve energy in order 
to help the Swedish economy (Lhfstedt 1991b). 
fossil fuels.2g These measures are deemed essential for a nuclear phase-out, and they attempt to  
answer the critics who have suggested that  from 1980 up t o  now there has been little government 
attention t o  these areas. 
4 Public Participation 
Energy policies in Sweden are largely decided by experts in the various political parties, those 
from the former Swedish Energy Administration, and some selected academics, but with little or 
no input from the general public. Policies vary depending on which part of the political spectrum 
they originate from, and with personal or institutional convictions about nuclear power. 
The views of those outside of this group; including industry, business, the general public and the 
non-governmental sector are seldom solicited. Even when these groups are consulted, as in the 
case of the nuclear referendum, their input is not effectively incorporated into policy making. 
Thus, little time or effort is spent in informing the public of policy choices or in making decisions 
realistic for their needs. 
The former Center Party leader, Falldin, had firm moral, anti- nuclear beliefs. Along with the 
anti-nuclear movement within the Center Party, Fdldin devised fantastic non-nuclear electricity 
scenarios. These led the party-at the height of the 1976 election campaign-to promise that  
all of Sweden's nuclear reactors would be phased-out by 1985. Their reasoning was that  a 50% 
saving in energy use could be achieved, at  no cost to society, through residential conservation 
(Vedung 1980a and b, 1988). However, no data on the feasibility of such a large domestic energy 
saving exists for that  time (Vedung 1980a). 
Academians have also advocated energy policies with little practical feasibility. An energy 
scenario for the year 2000 based almost wholly on solar energy (Johansson and Steen 1979), 
although technically feasible on paper, took little account of the large and costly changes in 
infrastructure (eg. solar panels on residential structures) or social implications of such changes 
(eg. driving battery powered cars). 
The elitism discussed above illustrates politicians disregard of public opinion. The democratic 
nature of the country's government implies that  policy makers are accountable t o  the public 
(Wahlstrom 1991a), but as the Swedish policy system is considered t o  be consensual, rather 
than adversarial, most political decisions take place behind closed doors with little input from 
the public (O'Riordan 1985, Sahr 1985).~' 
The argument has been made that  the public, by exercising their right t o  vote in elections and 
referenda, do actively participate in the policy making process (Lindberg 1977a and b). However, 
the public's influence exerted through this process is much more theoretical than practical. This 
is illustrated particularly with referenda. 
A consultive vote was held in 1955 to  see if the Swedish public wanted t o  LLfall in" with the rest 
of Europe and change to driving on the right hand side of the road. They voted overwhelmingly 
(82.9%) t o  keep on driving on the left side. However, in 1967 the government went against the 
public consensus and passed a law t o  make the Swedes drive on the right. Similarly with the 
1980 nuclear referendum, it is likely that  the policy makers will not abide by it. Thus I would 
argue that  public participation in the development of Swedish energy policy has had only a 
29These prototype ethanol factories may not in fact be viable. The Swedish farmers union has advised its 
members not to supply them as  the factory price will be below production costs (Johansson, A. 1991). 
''One reason for the closed door policy is the policy makers belief that the general public has little ability to 
understand complex problems, and tend to respond emotionally to various energy issues concerning risk (NRC 
1989).  
minimal role. The consensual approach has led policy makers to  assume that  decisions will be 
accepted by the general public; it has gone so far that  policy makers expect t o  shape attitudes 
and educate the public rather than, as in the United States, simply t o  influence them (Kelman 
1981) . 
As policy makers themselves are divided about energy issues (an example is the split within 
the Social Democratic Party), the general public, subjected to  widely conflicting information, 
has become disillusioned. Thus, the public expresses concern over the inadequate information 
they receive from policy makers, the media, etc. on various energy issues (Lofstedt 1991a). In a 
recent survey conducted by SIFO, for example, results indicated that  the public are much more 
distrustful of the politicians than they were prior to  the 1988 general elections (Ljungberg 1991). 
The issue of poor communication between policy makers and the public is mentioned by several 
researchers (Boehmer-Christiansen 1990, Wahlstrom 1991a).~l Over recent years policy makers 
have not sought to  gain further understanding of the topic as public opinion has not created a 
demand for energy research (Andresen 1989). The government's decisions to  cut all funding (in 
1990) to  the Council of Energy Research (Energi Forsknings Namden) to  integrate (in July of 
1991) the Energy Administration's functions into an umbrella researchlindustrial organization, 
and the sale of the State Power Board all point to  a decrease in energy research (both the 
Swedish Energy Administration and the Council for Energy Research provided sizable funds for 
academic organizations). 
The Greenhouse Eflect Example 
The discussion of the greenhouse effect well illustrates the general public's lack of knowledge 
on energy and environment issues. Although probably the most widely discussed environmental 
problem, global warming has not been addressed by Swedish policy makers at  the national level. 
In the summer of 1990, the author conducted a study in the town of Umeb, Sweden, concerning 
people's knowledge of the greenhouse effect. The results indicated that  the general public had a 
minimal understanding of the causes, consequences, and ways to  prevent global climate change. 
Although similar results have been reported elsewhere (Childs et al. 1988, Kempton 1991) the 
results are surprising for Sweden, as one would expect the Swedish public to  be more knowledge- 
able for several reasons. Firstly, the Swedes are considered to  be one of the most environmentally 
aware people in the world (Vasterbottens Kuriren 1990). Secondly, the nuclear power debate 
has brought to  their attention the implications of alternative energy sources, including the use 
of fossil fuels and resultant increases in carbon dioxide emissions. 
However, the results are supported by a local media analysis. The most widely read local paper 
(Vasterbottens Kuriren), over the year prior t o  the study, carried only 13 articles discussing 
the greenhouse effect (Lofstedt 1991b). This figure is very small when compared with other 
newspaper sources such as The New York Times which carried eighty articles over a similar 
period (Kasperson et al. 1 9 9 0 ) . ~ ~  
While the Swedish public remain ill informed, policy makers may make decisions that  the public 
311t should be remembered that the Swedes follow a type of party discipline, in that they cast their votes for 
a political party rather than for an individual. The political system is devised such that there are 27 political 
districts, with each party having a ranked list of potential candidates in each district. The more votes a party 
receives in a district, the more people from its list will have a seat in parliament. Thus, there is less emphasis on 
individual candidates, as it is the parties' local strength that determines who becomes a member of parliament. 
This system is widely different from that in the United States, where the political future of the individual is 
determined much more by their campaigning ability (Sahr 1985). 
32~l though not directly comparable in terms of style or circulation to the New York Times, the Vkterbottens 
Kuriren represents a major news/information source in the area of Umei, as does the New York Times for the 
United States. 
would not accept if they had more access to information. In 1988 Sweden signed the Toronto 
agreement which called for a twenty percent reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by 2005. In 
order to  achieve this goal the Swedish government passed a bill requiring stabilization of carbon 
dioxide emissions at 1988 levels. However, in January of 1991 that  same Swedish government 
revoked the bill as a result of economic concerns. The Swedish government believed that  it 
would be much more economical for Sweden to  finance carbon dioxide emissions abatement in 
foreign nations than at home. However, only a month previously, a SIFO survey showed that 
more than 60% of the public were in favor of the carbon dioxide cap. Additionally, only six 
months earlier, the Swedish public had expressed fear of the greenhouse effect (Ldfstedt 1991b 
and 1992.) This illustrates the government's failure to  recognize public opinion in the decision 
making process, and t o  communicate accurate information about policy options. 
The idea of effective public participation thus offers an expeditious way t o  address the current 
energy policy dilemma. It would force policy makers t o  increase their knowledge of energy and 
environmental issues so as to  give realistic responses t o  public questions, and give a greater 
openness t o  the whole policy debate (Andresen 1989). And as such, it would provide a basis 
for overall policy formation that  is likely t o  be sustainable and effective in the long term (Prins 
1990). 
5 Conclusions 
Swedish energy policy can be characterized by controversy, elitism, and contradictory decision 
making. Decisions have been made without reference to  the public, which goes against the values 
of democracy. In order for public participation to  play a major role in the Swedish energy policy 
debate, the information flow between the policy maker and the person on the street must be 
increased and must be reciprocal. For this to  occur, the policy maker must recognize that in the 
long term a one way information flow will not produce consensus and only lead to frustration 
(Stern 1991). Adopting this approach would mean that future energy policy is less likely to  
follow the incremental track, which has caused problems over recent years. Rather it would 
promote informed energy policies encompassing the needs of all the actors involved. Without 
such changes to  policy formation, and as long as the Swedish economy can afford it, politicians 
will continue to press ideological and moral goals, and pass the real decisions t o  someone eke's 
term of office (as Falldin did); there will be no limit to muddling through. 
If the public were to be consulted by policy makers (possibly through existing surveys and 
consultation with non governmental groups), the present energy policy situation would be much 
different: nuclear power would not be phased out until after 2010 (Dagens Nyheter 1991) (at 
which time energy conservation and renewables would be better placed t o  bridge the energy gap), 
the 1988 carbon dioxide cap would stay in place (Ldfstedt 1991b, Svenska Dagbladet 1990), and 
there would be no more discussion of the build out of the four remaining rivers for hydro power 
(Lofstedt 1991a). Furthermore, there would be no energy dilemma. 
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